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Abstract
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This paper combines firm-level data from 89 countries 
with updated country-level data on financial structure, 
and uses two estimation approaches. It finds that in low-
income countries, labor growth is swifter in countries 
with a higher level of private credit/gross domestic 
product; the positive effect of bank credit is especially 
pronounced in industries that depend heavily on external 
finance; and banking development is positively associated 
with more physical and human capital investment. 
These findings are consistent with predictions from new 
structural economics. In high-income countries, labor 
growth rates are increasing in the level of stock market 
This paper is a product of the Finance and Private Sector Development Team, Development Research Group. It is part of 
a larger effort by the World Bank to provide open access to its research and make a contribution to development policy 
discussions around the world. Policy Research Working Papers are also posted on the Web at http://econ.worldbank.org. 
The author may be contacted at rcull@worldbank.org.  
capitalization, which is also consistent with predictions 
from new structural economics, although the analysis 
is unable to provide evidence that the association is 
causal. It finds no evidence that small-scale firms in 
low-income countries benefit most from private credit 
market development. Rather, the labor growth rates of 
larger, capital-intensive firms increase more with the 
level of private credit market development, a finding 
consistent with the history-based political economy view 
that banking systems in low-income countries serve the 
interests of the elite, rather than providing broad-based 
access to financial services. 
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I.  Introduction 
The relative advantages of different types of financial systems have been long debated, most 
notably in comparisons between market-based and bank-based financial structures (Gershenkron, 
1962; Goldsmith, 1969; Allen and Gale, 1991; Demirguc-Kunt and Levine, 2001).  Banks, for 
example, are able to exploit economies in processing information about the creditworthiness of 
prospective borrowers, and often form long-run relationships with firms that reduce information 
asymmetries and permit effective monitoring of the firms‘ activities. Securities markets provide 
an incentive to gather information about firms, provide a liquid platform for investors to buy and 
sell shares in those firms, and can improve corporate governance of firms by facilitating 
takeovers. More generally, markets are likely to do a better job of aggregating and transmitting 
information signals to investors than banks, which could improve the allocation of financial 
resources and thus promote growth.
2 
While the relative advantages of bank- and market-based systems have been elucidated 
well in the literature, the available empirical evidence does not indicate that either type holds an 
advantage in promoting growth. Indeed, cross-country evidence shows that it is the overall level 
of financial development rather than its institutional composition that is robustly linked with 
economic growth (Demirguc-Kunt and Levine, 2001; Levine, 2002). While cross-country 
indicators of financial development have proliferated and have been refined in the past decade, 
they necessarily carry limitations when describing the nuances of financial structure in a given 
country. It is possible, even likely, therefore that in a given country or at a specific time, 
productive activities would be better supported by banks or markets. 
This theme has been developed recently in the ―New Structural Economics‖ approach to 
studying economic development (Lin, 2010). Under that approach, factors endowments at each 
stage of an economy‘s development determine the optimal industrial structure in the real sector. 
That optimal mix of firms – their size distribution, sectors, and risk characteristics – is, in turn, 
better served by some types of financial institutions than others. As a result, proponents of this 
approach hold that there is an endogenously determined optimal financial structure at each stage 
of an economy‘s development.  Measurement problems are a key challenge to testing this 
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approach to financial development empirically. Case studies of individual countries lack 
sufficient variation in financial structure over time to permit formal hypothesis testing and, 
though cross-country financial indicators have come a long way in a short time, they remain 
relatively crude. Determining a country‘s optimal industrial structure and assessing the suitability 
of its financial structure using only cross-country regressions would be a daunting task.
3    
Moreover, economic and financial historians have devoted considerable effort to 
documenting the idiosyncratic, path-dependent processes that generated the diverse set of local 
financial intermediaries that came to exist across developed countries (Davis and Gallman, 2001; 
Cull et al., 2006; Allen et al, 2011).  The consensus view is that the specific financial institutions 
that evolved were certainly influenced by economic and political considerations. In that sense, 
financial development was not necessarily endogenous to an optimal matching with industrial 
structure, but to a much broader range of influences. Moreover, in the best studied developed 
economies, governments were not particularly active in promoting specific financial structures.  
They generally did little to inhibit the formation of financial intermediaries, but they also played 
little role in their creation—beyond providing a secure property-rights environment and 
establishing national financial institutions, such as central banks, that helped to mitigate local 
shocks. Nor were governments generally able to jumpstart economic growth by promoting local 
financial institutions in regions where there was insufficient demand for their services (Cull et 
al., 2006). The financial institutions that emerged were therefore generally endogenous to the 
demand for specific financial services. 
                                                           
3 However, Demirguc-Kunt, Feyen, and Levine (2011) define optimal financial structures at different stages of 
development based on cross-country regressions, and then calculate countries‘ distances from them. To construct a 
measure of optimal financial structure at each level of development, the authors regress a measure of financial 
structure (such as the ratio of bank development to securities market development) on GDP per capita for the sample 
of OECD countries, while also controlling for key institutional, geographic, and structural traits of those countries. 
The maintained hypothesis is that conditional on these traits, the OECD countries provide information on how the 
optimal financial structure varies with economic development. Next, the authors use the coefficients from the OECD 
regression to compute the estimated optimal financial structure for each country in each year. They then compute a 
―financial structure gap‖ which is equal to the natural logarithm of the absolute value of the difference between the 
actual and the estimated optimal financial structure. They find that deviations in an economy‘s actual financial 
structure from its estimated optimal one (i.e., the size of the financial development gap) are associated with reduced 
economic output even when controlling for the level of bank development, securities market development, a 
standard set of controls, and country fixed effects. 
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Proponents of new structuralism might view the financial histories of developed 
economies as promising for their approach – since the evolution of financial intermediaries was 
endogenous to demand for financial services from the real sector, an optimal financial structure 
might be a by-product of an optimal industrial structure. And yet, the industrial structures that 
emerged in many countries were far from optimal, and thus the financial structures that evolved 
did not function as well as they might have. As described in Calomiris and Haber (2011), in less 
developed economies financial intermediaries are often created by coalitions that include the 
government and business interests. Those business interests must be assured that the government 
will not expropriate the intermediaries that they create, nor will it promote the entry of 
competing intermediaries, because those intermediaries could finance firms that would compete 
with those of the members of the coalition. The result is a financial system comprised of a small 
number of relatively large banks and other intermediaries that service affiliated firms, but that do 
not promote widespread access to financial services, especially credit. This is at odds with the 
optimal financial structure during early stages of development from the new structural 
perspective, where a large number of relatively small banks would service small-scale 
entrepreneurs. 
The foregoing discussion leads to (at least) two questions. First, can it be shown that the 
countries that come closer to achieving the optimal financial structure for their stage of 
development also achieve higher rates of growth? More specifically, do countries in early stages 
of development fare better under a bank-based system that harnesses local information rather 
than a market-based system that does not? Second, if there is evidence supportive of the notion 
that optimal financial structure varies with the stage of development, why is it that some 
countries come closer to achieving those structures than others? This paper provides empirical 
evidence from firm surveys to address the first question. Addressing the second question is 
beyond the scope of the paper, though we note that if countries were equally successful in 
achieving an optimal financial structure, we would see little variation in financial structure 
indicators for a given level of development and find no significant relationships between those 
indicators and firm growth. A quick glance at Table 2 reveals relatively wide variation in 
indicators of financial development within countries at similar stages of economic development 
as reflected in per capita income, and we do find significant relationships between financial 5 
 
development indicators and firm growth in what follows, relationships that vary with per capita 
income. 
Our approach relies on a measure of firm growth from the World Bank Enterprise 
Surveys (WBES) database – the percentage increase in the number of workers over the two years 
prior to the survey. While labor growth is a topic of intense interest, there are also practical 
reasons for focusing on that measure in this analysis.
4 Other measures of firm growth (such as 
sales growth) are also available, but our measure of labor growth is available for a much larger 
set of firms and countries. Testing the hypothesis that financial structure affects firm growth 
differentially, depending on a country‘s level of economic development, requires as wide a 
sample of countries as possible, since the financial structure indicators are measured at the 
country level. Our most expansive regression models employ information from over 49,000 
firms in 89 countries.
5  Relying on labor (rather than sales) growth has another side advantage: 
labor is likely to be measured with less error than sales for both accounting and tax reasons, and 
such measurement errors may differ systematically by the level of development.   
To foreshadow our main result, we find that firms grow faster in countries with low 
levels of income per capita when the banking system is relatively well-developed. We find no 
such results for other measures of financial structure, including measures of stock market 
development. Moreover, we find no strong relationships between financial structure and firm 
labor growth for countries with high levels of per capita income, in line with previous findings in 
the literature (Levine, 2002; Demirguc-Kunt and Levine, 2001). Our results are robust to using 
the instrumental variables method to deal with the potential endogeneity of our financial 
structure variables.  
We also apply the regression methodology pioneered by Rajan and Zingales (1998) 
(henceforth RZ) to test whether firms in industries that rely heavily on external financing have 
higher labor growth rates in countries with relatively well developed financial sectors. We find 
evidence consistent with that proposition, but only for firms in low-income countries with 
                                                           
4  For example, job growth is the topic of the upcoming World Development Report for 2013, and a key concern of 
the current U.S. administration. 
5 Not only the firm-level survey information, but also a steady expansion in the number of countries that have 
financial structure data available enables us to undertake this analysis. For comparison, the original financial 
structure indicators presented in Levine (2002) were available for only 48 countries. 6 
 
relatively well developed banking sectors. While the instrumental variables approaches focus on 
between-country differences, the RZ approach captures within-country, between-industry 
differences in labor growth rates. That both approaches yield similar results provides support for 
the plausibility of our findings.  Our confidence regarding the beneficial role of banks in poor 
countries is further boosted by our finding that a more developed banking system is associated 
with higher investment rates, more employee training, and larger firm sizes only in poor 
countries, which suggest that banks spur both physical and human capital investment besides 
boosting job growth in such countries. 
The WBES also contains a substantial amount of information on firm characteristics 
(size, industry, ownership structure, legal status) that enable us to further pinpoint the types of 
firms that benefit from a relatively well developed banking system in countries at early stages of 
development. Although banks appear to be the financial institutions best suited to serve firms in 
low income countries based on our results, it does not appear that they disproportionately serve 
the small-scale firms that are said to characterize the early stages of economic development. In 
low-income countries, labor growth increases with the size of the banking sector primarily for 
relatively large, capital-intensive firms.   
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section II describes the enterprise survey 
and financial structure data in greater detail and presents summary statistics.  Section III 
describes the variables that we use as instruments for our indicators of financial development in 
firm growth regressions. It also shows how those variables are related to each other and to our 
indicators of financial development. Section IV explains both our estimation approach based on 
instrumental variables and that based on the RZ methodology, and presents our main regression 
results. Section V examines the types of firms that are most affected by financial structure in 
high- and low-income countries.  Section VI examines whether other firm characteristics and 
performance measures are related to financial development, so as to better understand potential 
mechanisms by which banking sector development fosters firm growth in low-income countries. 
Section VII concludes.  7 
 
II.  Data 
Sampling from the universe of registered businesses and following a uniform stratified random 
sampling methodology, the core WBES uses a standardized survey instrument to benchmark the 
investment climate of individual economies across the world.
6  The survey contains sufficient 
information to allow for firm performance analyses. The surveys also report detailed information 
on firm employment, age, industry, ownership, legal status, and the number of establishments.  
As noted above, our analysis is designed to explain variation in firm labor growth. We 
use the percentage growth in the number of full-time employees over the two years prior to the 
survey as the dependent variable in our regressions because that information was asked of firms 
in a wider sample of countries than, for example, information about sales growth. In addition, the 
information provided by firm owners regarding their number of employees is likely to be more 
accurate than information about their sales, especially for smaller firms that either do not keep 
good accounting records or are reluctant to fully report their sales (e.g., because of potential tax 
consequences).  For the 89 countries whose firms enter our regressions, the WBES surveys were 
conducted at different points in time between 2000 and 2009.   
We use three firm characteristics as controls in our firm growth regressions: age, size as 
measured by the current number of employees, and the percentage of shares held by foreign 
owners.  Both firm age and number of employees enter the regressions in logged form. We do 
not have strong priors about how these characteristics affect firms‘ labor growth, though if older 
firms are more likely to have reached their equilibrium size, they might have slower growth than 
younger firms.  Percentage growth in employees might be greater for smaller firms, as they are 
starting from a low base of employees, but larger firms may have advantages, especially in terms 
of access to finance, that make hiring additional workers easier. It is also unclear whether firms 
with high shares of foreign ownership would expand employment more or less quickly than 
firms with higher shares of domestic ownership.   Better access to finance by foreign firms 
would allow faster expansion, but a shorter-term focus on the part of those firms may limit firm 
expansion.     
                                                           
6 A detailed description of the sample design and sample frame can be found at: 
http://www.enterprisesurveys.org/documents/Sampling_Note.pdf. 8 
 
The key explanatory variables in our analysis are indicators of financial structure that are 
drawn from the World Bank Database on Financial Development and Structure, which was 
updated in November 2010.
7 We rely on two primary variables that are intended to capture 
different aspects of each country‘s financial structure – the ratio of private credit to GDP and the 
ratio of stock market capitalization to GDP. From previous research on the finance-growth 
nexus, we would expect growth in employment to be positively linked to both of these measures. 
However, the new structural economics predicts that the association between firm growth and 
private credit relative to GDP, which is a bank-based measure of financial development, should 
be stronger for countries in early stages of development. By contrast, the association between 
employment growth and stock market capitalization (relative to GDP) is likely to be stronger for 
countries in more advanced stages of economic development.   
Another aspect of financial structure that could impact firm growth is the nature of 
ownership—the extent to which the banking sector is state-owned or foreign. As we shall later 
show, however, neither state nor foreign ownership of banks explains variation in labor growth 
in our sample. The ratios of private credit to GDP and stock market capitalization to GDP are 
therefore the focus of the empirical analysis that follows.
8 
Perhaps the first thing to notice from Table 2, which provides summary statistics for our 
four indicators of financial development, is that country coverage is broader for the private credit 
                                                           
7 More detailed descriptions of the dataset can be found in Beck, Demirguc-Kunt, and Levine (2000) and Beck and 
Demirguc-Kunt (2009). The permanent URL for accessing the dataset is: http://go.worldbank.org/X23UD9QUX0. 
8 In banking systems characterized by a high degree of ownership by the government, banks‘ credit growth, portfolio 
quality, profitability, and productivity tend to suffer (Barth, Caprio, and Levine 2001; 2004; La Porta, Lopez-de-
Silanes, and Shleifer 2002). We would therefore expect the employment growth of firms to be slower in countries 
with state-dominated banking systems. Our data on the share of banking sector assets held by state-owned banks is 
taken from Micco, Panizza, and Yañez (2007). We do not have a strong prior about whether any pernicious effects 
of state ownership of banks would be stronger or weaker in countries in early development stages. 
The share of foreign bank ownership could also affect firms‘ employment growth. On the one hand, foreign banks 
tend to be more efficient than domestic banks in developing countries (see, e.g., Claessens, Demirguc-Kunt, and 
Huizinga, 2001). Their presence could therefore impose competitive pressure, resulting in lower interest rates on 
loans and, perhaps, a search for new borrowers, thus expanding the outreach of the banking system. All of these 
aspects of foreign bank participation could boost firms‘ labor growth. At the same time, there are longstanding 
concerns about the tendency of foreign banks to focus their lending on large, well-established firms. In banking 
sectors dominated by foreign banks, medium and small-sized borrowers might suffer in terms of access to credit, 
resulting in slower labor growth. Proponents of New Structural Economics would be especially concerned about the 
mismatch between foreign-owned banks and the large share of small businesses in developing countries.   We test 
these ideas in our labor growth regressions using data on the share of banking sector assets held by majority-foreign-
owned banks from Claessens and Van Horen (2009).   
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measure, with 46 countries at or below the sample median for income per capita, and 45 
countries above the median. This is another reason that private credit is the financial indicator 
that plays the primary role in our analysis. For stock market capitalization/GDP and the shares of 
banking sector assets held by state and foreign-owned banks, the sample tilts in favor of high 
income countries (37-40 country observations) as opposed to lower income countries (21-22 
observations).  In part, this could reflect that stock markets and large shares of foreign bank 
participation are more likely to be features of the financial systems of advanced countries than of 
developing countries. For the share of sector assets held by state-owned banks, however, this is 
not true. The prevalence of observations from richer countries on that indicator likely indicates 
the relative difficulty of collecting data summarizing financial development in low-income 
countries. In any event, for the indicators other than private credit/GDP, the relatively small set 
of lower income countries makes it more difficult to test hypotheses about optimal financial 
structure based on predictions from new structural economics. 
As expected, higher income countries have more developed financial sectors in terms of 
their average private credit/GDP, stock market capitalization/GDP, and the share of assets held 
by foreign-owned banks (Table 2). The average share of sector assets held by state-owned banks 
tips slightly in favor of lower income countries (0.20 vs. 0.16 for higher income countries), 
though the median state-owned bank asset share is almost identical for the two groups.  
At least two other features of the summary statistics for the financial indicators stand out. 
First, although higher income countries tend to have more developed financial sectors, there is 
overlap in the distributions of the financial indicators between higher and lower income 
countries. For example, among lower income countries, those in the top ten percentile have 
private credit/GDP ratios of 37.8% or higher, which would rank them at or above the median for 
higher income countries. A second feature is that within the group of low (or high) income 
countries, there is substantial variation on all financial development indicators despite relatively 
small sample sizes. For example, the ratio of stock market capitalization to GDP runs from 1% at 
the tenth percentile to 34% at the 90
th percentile for countries in the lower income sample. On 
the one hand, this suggests that if there is an optimal financial structure that varies with stage of 
development as reflected per capita income levels, a sizable fraction of the countries in our 
sample are not achieving it. On the other hand, and perhaps more practically, the fact that there is 10 
 
substantial variation in financial structure within both the high and low income samples enables 
us to test whether certain structures yield better outcomes in terms of employment growth, and 
whether those structures differ depending on the income level of a country.   
III.  Instruments 
Endogeneity poses the major challenge for identifying a causal relation between financial 
structure and firm growth at different stages of economic development. In particular, we are 
worried about two possibilities. First, there might be omitted variables that are correlated with 
both labor growth and our financial structure variables.  For instance, omitted business 
environment indicators might be correlated with both financial development and firm growth 
(Xu 2011).  Second, the causality may run both ways, both from finance to growth and from 
growth to finance.  
While the next section describes both our instrumental variables regressions and those 
based on the RZ methodology as means of confronting this endogeneity, we begin first with a 
discussion of potential instruments in this section. The earliest approaches to address the 
endogeneity of financial development in cross-country growth regressions focused on legal 
origin variables as instruments (LaPorta, Lopes-de-Silanes, Shleifer and Vishny, 1998; Levine, 
Loayza, and Beck, 2000). French legal origin, in particular, was associated with lower levels of 
financial development relative to English and, especially, German legal origin.   A parallel line 
of research designed to explain broader institutional development and its impact on growth 
emphasizes the role of endowments. In particular, commodity endowments (Engerman and 
Sokoloff, 1997, 2000) and settler mortality rates (Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson, 2001, 
2002) explain substantial variation in the quality of institutions, which in turn explain variation 
in long-run growth trajectories as reflected in current per capita income levels. Another offshoot 
of the literature uses aspects of a country‘s population, namely ethnolinguistic fractionalization 
(Alesina, Baqir, and Easterly, 1999; Easterly and Levine, 1997) and trust levels among citizens 
(Zak and Knack, 2001), to explain the quality of institutions and their relationship with economic 
growth. 
We prefer to explain financial development and structure using endowments as 
instruments because they are more deeply rooted in a theory that connects initial exogenous 11 
 
conditions with the creation, quality, and persistence of institutions. To some extent, 
ethnolinguistic fractionalization could also be a product of those initial conditions, while trust 
levels could be a manifestation of homogeneous societies and the relatively egalitarian 
distributions of income that derived from some endowment structures. While our preference is to 
explain financial development using variables that summarize initial endowments, we are 
mindful of the warning from Easterly and Levine (2000) that exogeneity is not the sole criteria 
for selection of economically meaningful instrumental variables in this context: there must also 
be compelling reasons to expect that a variable is closely linked to the behavior of financial 
intermediaries. They therefore opted for the legal origin variables in their work. We 
acknowledge the advantages and disadvantages of the endowments and legal origins variables as 
instruments, and thus perform an exploratory analysis to see which variables best explain 
variation in the broader set of countries for which financial development indicators are now 
available. A brief description of the specific variables that we try and their motivation for 
inclusion as instruments follows. 
Commodities, Natural Resources 
Engerman and Sokoloff (1997) argue that the land endowments of Latin America were amenable 
to commodities that featured economies of scale in production and thus the use of a large share 
of slave and indigenous labor (sugar cane, rice, silver). Power was thus historically concentrated 
in the hands of the plantation and mining elite, and the institutional structure that arose and 
persisted offered economic opportunity to only a small group. In contrast, the endowments of 
North America lent themselves to commodities grown on family farms (particularly wheat and 
maize) which fostered the growth of a relatively large middle class in which power was widely 
distributed. The institutions that arose and persisted came to reflect this relative equality of 
economic opportunity. These factors help account for the disparity in income per capita between 
North America and Latin America. We therefore include dummy variables indicating whether 
any of a given commodity is grown in each country as potential instruments.  Corn, maize, and 
wheat growth are our proxies for the egalitarian institutions emphasized by Engerman and 
Sokoloff, which we expect to be positively linked to financial development. 12 
 
A related literature examines whether endowments of natural resources, particularly oil, 
are associated with lower levels of economic development. The existence of a so-called resource 
curse has been analyzed and debated extensively (Sachs and Warner 1995, 2001; Lederman and 
Maloney, 2008; van der Ploeg, 2011). The ease with which profits can be generated from natural 
resources could be associated with less investment in other forms of production, such as 
manufacturing. In turn, there might be less incentive to invest in the research and development, 
human capital, and institutions (property rights protection, contractual frameworks, and courts) 
needed to support the market-based exchange that characterizes non-resource based production 
(Besley and Persson, 2010). In terms of financial development and structure, broad-based access 
to financial services is less likely to be provided in resource-based economies. In fact, recent 
evidence shows that the outreach of the financial systems of the resource-based economies is 
narrow, as firms in those economies are less likely to use any form of external finance and they 
receive substantially less credit from banks (Beck 2011). We therefore include a measure of an 
economy‘s dependence on oil, the net exports of petroleum per worker, in the set of potential 
instruments. We expect that variable to be negatively associated with financial development 
indicators.  A key advantage of using this measure is that it is available for most countries. 
Moreover, Maloney and Lederman (2008) show that measures based on net exports are more 
closely linked to actual natural resource reserves than other trade-based endowment measures.   
Settler Mortality 
Another influential strand of the literature on the effects of endowments on institutional 
development and growth trajectories focuses on rates of settler mortality (Acemoglu, Johnson, 
and Robinson, 2001, 2002). In climates and environments that were inhospitable for 
development as reflected in high rates of settler mortality, Europeans created states and 
institutions that enabled elites to extract wealth from colonies, usually in the form of minerals 
and cash crops. By contrast, in more hospitable environments, settler colonies emerged in which 
institutions were created to protect property rights and thus foster more broad-based economic 
opportunity. Indeed, Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson (2001) find robust evidence that settler 
mortality has a pervasive influence on a whole series of key property rights institutions such as 
protection against expropriation by the government, constraints on the executive, and the 
establishment of democracy.  Since relatively widespread access to financial services is likely to 13 
 
be reflective of the more egalitarian institutions that emerged in settler colonies, we include the 
logarithm of annualized deaths per thousand European soldiers in the set of potential 
instruments, which we expect to be negatively associated with financial development indicators.   
Fractionalization and Trust 
Zak and Knack (2001) develop a theoretical model of the effect of trust on growth. In it, 
consumers are randomly matched with a broker who makes an investment on their behalf. Prior 
to the payout from that investment, consumers decide how much time and effort to spend 
investigating the quality of the broker‘s investment. Aside from the consumer‘s investigation, 
two sets of institutions are incorporated into the model to provide incentives for untrustworthy 
brokers to reduce the amount of the payout that they cheat consumers out of. The first, which is 
operationalized in the model as a partial loss of the broker‘s fee, represents formal institutions 
such as investigative agencies and the judicial system that detect and punish brokers for abuses. 
The second, which is operationalized as the social proximity between consumer and broker, 
represents informal institutions that can impose sanctions on cheating brokers through social ties. 
These sanctions could include the guilt associated with violating social norms, religious dictates 
concerning, for example, the afterlife, social ostracism, or loss of profits due to reputational 
effects. 
The key insight from the model is that the amount of investment is declining in the level 
of distrust between consumers and brokers, because consumers spend more resources 
investigating their brokers.  Lower investment has an adverse impact on growth. In turn, trust is 
lower (and cheating by brokers more likely) when social distances are greater, formal institutions 
are weaker, and informal social sanctions are less effective.  Cross-country regressions validate 
the predictions of the theoretical model in that trust among citizens is strongly positively linked 
to both investment levels and growth rates.  
We hypothesize that trust, which arises as a manifestation of the social and institutional 
environment, could help facilitate financial intermediation.  A higher level of trust, for instance, 
may lower information asymmetry between lenders and borrowers; it may also facilitate the 
social norm of not defaulting on debts.  We therefore include the average level of trust in a 
country from 1981 to 2006 among the potential instruments and we expect it to be positively 14 
 
linked to indicators of financial development.
9  We use the average from 1981 to 2006 (rather 
than from the actual year of the WBES survey) because data on trust are available for distinct 
years for different countries, and relying on the survey year would lead to too many missing 
values for trust for our countries.  Averaging also has the benefit of smoothing the measurement 
errors of trust.  
Zak and Knack also note that their framework can help account for other findings from 
the cross-country growth literature. For example, the negative link between ethnic 
fractionalization and growth found in Easterly and Levine (1997) and between income inequality 
and growth in Easterly (1999) are both substantially weakened when levels of interpersonal trust 
are included in regressions. Although the channels through which social ties and the institutional 
environment affect trust are more clearly laid out than for the polarization measures, we include 
measures of ethnic and linguistic fractionalization among the set of potential instruments. We 
expect them to be negatively linked to financial development indicators. 
Legal Origin 
LaPorta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny (LLSV) (1997, 1998) first documented that the 
legal protection of outside investors was stronger in common law countries (English legal origin) 
than in civil law countries rooted in Roman legal traditions, particularly those of French legal 
origin. Their interpretation was that English common law traditions evolved to protect private 
property and support private market outcomes, whereas French civil law tended to unify the legal 
system and cement state control of the judicial system often to the detriment of private market 
development. Because legal traditions were introduced in most countries by outside colonizers, 
LLSV argued that legal origin could be treated as exogenous in regressions explaining financial 
development and growth. Using legal origin as an instrument for investor protection, they then 
demonstrated a strong link between those protections and measures of financial development. 
We therefore include dummy variables for English and French legal origins in the set of potential 
instruments. We expect English (French) legal origin to be positively (negatively) linked to 
financial development.  
                                                           
9 The measure is based on information from the World Values Survey.  See Knack and Zak (2001) for details of its 
construction. 15 
 
To summarize the discussion to this point, we are able to exploit three advantages over 
previous studies: (1) a large firm-level database drawn from extensive surveys which provide a 
precise measure of firm growth as well as valuable information on firm characteristics, (2) 
updated data on financial structure, which enables us to include a broader set of countries in our 
regressions than what was used in previous studies of bank-based versus market-based financial 
systems, and (3) a broader set of potential instruments, many of them tied directly to theoretical 
arguments about how endowments shape institutions, including financial ones.    
Table 3 presents correlations between financial development indicators, potential 
instruments for financial development, and the firm characteristics that we include in the labor 
growth regressions. Table 4 presents regressions of financial development on firm characteristics 
and potential instruments, each added to the regression separately. The strongest correlations are 
negative ones between settler mortality and financial development (private credit/GDP; stock 
market capitalization/GDP). Next are the positive correlations between financial development 
and interpersonal trust. Note that the ethnic fractionalization measure was not strongly linked to 
financial development (results not in the table) and so we present only the trust measure in 
Tables 3 and 4. 
Surprisingly, neither the legal origin variables nor our resource-based measures of 
endowments (commodities dummies, net oil exports) are significantly correlated with financial 
development. Though we tried a variety of variables, we found no strong positive relationships 
between grains and financial development, as we had expected from our reading of Engerman 
and Sokoloff, and thus we do not present the commodities dummies in the tables. We do present 
the net oil exports variable. Though it is not strongly correlated with our measures of financial 
development, it has some explanatory power for both variables (with t-statistics between 1.2 and 
1.3).  Similarly, though only English legal origin appears in the tables, we experimented with 
French legal origin and combinations of legal origins (e.g., non-English, non-French) and found 
no strong relationships with our measures of financial development. 
For the most part, the regressions that control for firm characteristics in Table 4 confirm 
the correlations in Table 3. For example, private credit is significantly negatively linked to settler 
mortality and significantly positively linked to interpersonal trust. We also obtain the expected 16 
 
signs for net petroleum exports (negative) and British legal origin (positive), though neither 
achieves significance. The instruments do a poorer job of explaining variation in stock market 
capitalization, with the exception of settler mortality which is negative and significant. Trust and 
British legal origin both have the expected signs, and the trust coefficient comes reasonably close 
to significance. Weaker relationships between the potential instruments and stock market 
capitalization could be due to the smaller sample size for that variable relative to private credit. 
Based on Tables 3 and 4, settler mortality and trust appear to be the most relevant 
instruments for explaining financial development. Note, however, that the net petroleum exports 
variable becomes significantly negative in the private credit regressions when it appears with 
other instruments. For example, in the first stage of the GMM regressions that we describe in the 
next section, both trust and net petroleum exports are highly significant predictors of private 
credit (see Appendix A. for an example).  
In the end, settler mortality does not appear in the first stage results despite its strong 
association with financial development in Tables 3 and 4. This is because the instrument set does 
not pass Hansen‘s J test of over-identifying restrictions when settler mortality is included. For 
the exclusion restrictions to be satisfied, the instruments should affect labor growth only through 
their effects on financial development. Because settler mortality has been shown to be so 
strongly linked to broad measures of institutional and economic development (Acemoglu, 
Johnson, and Robinson, 2001, 2002)—for instance, we can conceivably see how settler mortality 
may directly affect local infrastructure and labor regulation, both of which may directly affect 
firm growth (Xu 2011)—it does not surprise us that its inclusion results in failure of the over-
identification restriction test (i.e., Hansen‘s J test). 
Because trust, especially as formulated in the Knack and Zak (2002) framework, could 
have a strong influence on contracting arrangements, we find it more plausible that its effects on 
labor growth could work largely through its positive impact on private credit levels. Similarly, 
the strong negative links between measures of countries‘ reliance on oil exports and various 
measures of financial development recently documented in Beck (2011) indicate that widespread 
access to financial services, particularly credit, is rare in resource-based economies. Therefore, 
the notion that net oil exports affects labor growth largely through its effects on financial 17 
 
development and structure also does not seem farfetched. In the GMM regressions that follow, 
we will show that the test of over-indentifying restrictions is passed when trust and net oil 
exports are used as instruments in most cases, and we will offer additional estimation approaches 
in the few cases when the test is not passed. 
Our approach in this section has been to experiment with a wide set of potential 
instruments suggested by the literature, and to let the data inform us about which ones best 
explain variation in financial development. At the same time, we bear in mind that legitimate 
instruments must affect firm labor growth only through their effect on financial development. 
Our assessment is that trust and net oil exports best meet those criteria, and thus those two 
variables form the instrument set in the instrumental variables regressions that follow.       
IV.  Regressions 
A.  OLS 
We estimate the following base regression: 
                                   (1) 
Where    is the percentage change in the number of workers employed by firm i in country j 
over the two years prior to the enterprise survey, as described above.  FIRM represents the three 
firm characteristics that we use as controls: age, size measured in (logarithm of) total workers, 
and the share of foreign ownership.
10 As described in Section 2, we expect that labor growth 
would be slower for older, better established firms. We have no strong priors about how firm size 
or foreign ownership share affect labor growth. FIN represents the indicators of financial 
development and structure that are the focus of the analysis. These include private credit/GDP, 
stock market capitalization/GDP, and the shares of sector assets held by foreign and state banks. 
We begin with ordinary least square (OLS) regressions describing the associations 
between indicators of financial development and structure and labor growth. We present results 
for the full sample of countries, and for high- and low-income sub-samples. We divide countries 
into high and low-income based on the median per capita income level for the 91 countries for 
                                                           
10 In unreported specifications, we include industry dummy variables. Qualitative results are similar to those 
presented here. 18 
 
which we have private credit/GDP figures, as we did for the summary statistics in Table 2. 
Standard errors are clustered at the country level in all models to avoid exaggeration of precision 
in firm-level regressions with country-level variables (Moulton 1990).   
The OLS regressions do suggest relationships between financial indicators and firm labor 
growth that are consistent with predictions from new structural economics (Table 5). For 
example, private credit/GDP is significantly positively associated with labor growth only for the 
sample of low-income countries, while stock market development/GDP is positively associated 
with labor growth among the high-income group. The magnitude of those coefficients is also 
large. For example, a one-standard deviation increase in private credit/GDP in the low-income 
group yields roughly a twenty percentage point increase in labor growth, compared to a mean 
labor growth rate of 58.8 percent (37.8 percent median) for that sample.
11    A one-standard 
deviation increase in stock market capitalization/GDP in the high income group is associated 
with a 17-27 percentage point increase in labor growth, compared to the 31 percent mean (24 
percent median) growth rate for that sample. 
In the low-income sample, the coefficient for stock market capitalization is positive in 
one specification, but does not achieve statistical significance. In the high-income sample, the 
coefficient for private credit/GDP is negative and significant in one specification, but that is 
likely due to the high correlation between the private credit and stock market capitalization 
indicators. Among the 64 countries that have values for both of those indicators, which is biased 
toward high-income countries since many low-income countries do not have information on 
stock market capitalization, the correlation is .66. When the stock market capitalization variable 
is dropped, the private credit variable is no longer significant in the high-income sample 
(regressions unreported).
12 In all, the associations between private credit and labor growth are 
strong in the low- income sample, while stock market capitalization is not linked to labor growth. 
The reverse is true among the high-income countries. 
Among the control variables, there is a strong negative relationship between firm age and 
labor growth across both high- and low-income countries. There is also a significant positive 
                                                           
11 Keep in mind that all labor growth rates are based on a two-year period. 
12 Note also that when the private credit variable is dropped from Table 5, model 9, the stock market capitalization 
variable remains positive and significant in the regressions for the high-income sample. Results are unreported but 
available from the authors.  19 
 
association for some models between firm size and labor growth. The share of foreign ownership 
in a firm is not strongly associated with labor growth for either sample. Because we split the 
sample by the level of per capita income, there is less need to include that variable in the labor 
growth regressions. However, in the regressions that pool all countries, that variable is negative 
and significant indicating that labor growth is slower in countries with high incomes (Table 5, 
model 3). For the sub-sample regressions, the coefficient for per capita income is also negative, 
and it is significant in the low-income sample. Perhaps more importantly, its inclusion does not 
qualitatively change results for other variables (Table 5, models 6 and 9). 
In Appendix B, we present OLS regressions that control for additional country-level 
variables to assess the robustness of our findings regarding financial development and firm labor 
growth. Because job growth likely depends on the quality of the institutional environment and 
the general level of stability, we include two variables: an index of adherence to rule of law and 
another measuring political stability. Certain industries may have experienced more rapid job 
growth during the period in which our surveys were conducted, and thus we also include 
variables that measure the share of GDP attributable to agriculture, manufacturing, and services 
(the omitted category) in our analysis. While these control variables are often significant, they do 
not change the coefficients for our indicators of financial development much. Private credit/GDP 
remains significantly positively linked to labor growth within the low-income sample; stock 
market capitalization/GDP is positively linked to labor growth in the high-income sample.     
B.  Instrumental Variables Regressions 
Because labor growth is as likely to affect financial structure as the reverse, or some omitted 
factors could be driving both high labor growth and financial development, it is important to 
investigate whether the associations between financial structure and firm labor growth in Table 5 
are causal. To address these concerns regarding the endogeneity of the financial structure 
variables, we present Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) estimates in Table 6.
13 As 
described above, we use the average level of interpersonal trust from 1981 to 2006 and net 
petroleum exports per worker as instruments. Both are measured at the country level. The first-
                                                           
13 We choose GMM over two-stage least squares because GMM can account for heteroskedasticity of unknown 
form (Woolridge, 2001). In practice, the two-stage least squares results were qualitatively similar to the GMM 
results presented here. 20 
 
stage F statistics for the excluded instruments and Shea‘s adjusted partial R-squared statistics 
indicate that the instruments are strong predictors of financial development in the poor sub-
sample. They also perform reasonably well for the full sample and for the rich sub-sample when 
private credit/GDP is the endogenous variable. They do not perform as well when stock market 
capitalization is treated as endogenous. This is not surprising because, as shown above, trust 
levels and net petroleum exports are not as strongly correlated with stock market capitalization.   
The main finding from the GMM regressions in Table 6 is that private credit/GDP 
remains positively associated with labor growth in the sample of low-income countries, though 
the coefficient is smaller than in the OLS regressions. We view this as evidence consistent with 
predictions from new structural economics and Gerschenkron (1962): in the early stages of 
economic development, banks are better able to foster firm growth than are stock markets. The 
p-values for Hansen‘s J test of over-identifying restrictions are far larger than critical values, 
providing additional support for the validity of our instruments. 
Stock market capitalization/GDP is not significantly linked to labor growth in the sample 
of high-income countries, in contrast to the OLS regressions.  The first-stage F statistics for the 
excluded instruments are small (around 2) whenever stock market capitalization is the 
endogenous financial structure variable in the GMM regressions. This reflects the low degree of 
correlation between stock market capitalization and our instruments. The instruments also do not 
pass Hansen‘s J test of over-identifying restrictions when stock market capitalization appears in 
the GMM regressions, indicating that trust and net petroleum exports likely do not affect labor 
growth only through their effects on market capitalization. In all, the GMM regressions do not 
provide support for a causal link between stock market capitalization and labor growth among 
firms in high-income countries. 
Since weak instruments could be the cause of the non-results for stock market 
capitalization in the GMM regressions, we also present Limited Information Maximum 
Likelihood (LIML) estimates (Appendix C).  Weak instruments cause less serious problems 
when estimation is conducted by LIML than by GMM.  However, qualitative results are similar 
for stock market capitalization in the LIML and GMM regressions, again providing no support 
for a causal link between that variable and labor growth in our sample. Indeed, the coefficients 21 
 
for market capitalization are negative in the high-income sample. At the same time, we recognize 
that this does not necessarily rule out a causal link. Our process for indentifying potential 
instruments simply failed to come up with candidates that worked well for stock market 
capitalization. In short, the positive coefficient for that variable in the OLS regressions might or 
might not reflect a causal link with firms‘ labor growth but our analysis did not uncover an 
instrument that could reveal the ‗true‘ relationship. 
We also present LIML results for private credit/GDP in Appendix C. Although the 
statistical tests from the GMM models supported the relevance and validity of our instruments 
(implying that recourse to LIML is not necessary), the LIML results for low-income countries 
are similar to the GMM results, though significance levels are a bit lower.  Still, the one result 
that is consistent across all estimation techniques in this section is the positive, significant 
relationship between private credit and firm labor growth in low-income countries. 
C.  Rajan-Zingales Methodology 
Another widely used method for identifying a causal link between financial sector development 
and growth comes from Rajan and Zingales (1998), focusing on how industry-level growth rates 
vary with both dependence on external sources of finance and the level of financial sector 
development in a country.
14 The key identifying assumption is that capital markets in the United 
States are relatively frictionless, and thus an industry‘s reliance on external finance in that 
country is a reliable indication of its true technological demand for external financing. Industry-
level dependence on external finance computed from U.S. data is therefore the key exogenous 
source of variation in their analysis. 
The equation that we estimate is: 
                                                            (2) 
where    is the percentage change in the number of workers employed by firm i in industry j in 
country k over the two years prior to the enterprise survey, as described above.    represents 
                                                           
14 See, for example, Fisman and Love (2007) and Kroszner, Laeven, and Klingebiel (2007) for applications of this 
method, and Xu (2011) for summary of the use of this method in identifying the effects of business environment in 
general. 22 
 
dummy variables for each industry;    represents dummies for each country. EXTDEP is the 
industry-level dependence on external finance based on U.S. data, which is equal to external 
finance (capital expenditures minus cash flow from operations) divided by capital expenditures, 
as defined in Rajan and Zingales (1998). We then interact that variable with FIN, which 
represents our indicators of financial development (private credit/GDP and stock market 
capitalization/GDP) in each country. A positive, significant coefficient for that interaction term is 
supportive of the notion that the labor growth of firms in externally dependent industries is faster 
relative to other industries in countries with relatively well developed financial sectors. Since our 
aggregate variable now varies at the country-industry level, we cluster our standard errors at the 
country-industry level in our analysis. 
Because it focuses on within-industry, between-country differences in labor growth, this 
approach is complementary to our instrumental variables regressions (which focus on cross-
country differences). Moreover, the inclusion of country and industry dummy variables makes 
this approach less susceptible to criticism about omitted variable bias and model mis-
specification than more traditional cross-country regressions. RZ relied on industry-level data 
because it provided the most disaggregated comprehensive data on growth at that time, whereas 
our surveys enable us to examine firm-level growth in a consistent manner across countries. 
Finer disaggregation should improve the precision of our estimates relative to industry-level 
approaches.  
Our main finding is that the interaction between industry-level dependence on external 
finance and private credit/GDP is significantly positively linked to labor growth in the sample of 
low-income countries (Table 7). By contrast, there is no significant relationship between labor 
growth and the interaction between stock market development and dependence on external 
finance in the sample of low-income countries. This is the same pattern as in our instrumental 
variables regressions.  Our finding indicates that, when evaluated at the median industry level of 
external finance (0.24), the country at the 90
th percentile of banking development would have a 
labor growth rate higher by 8.4 percentage points relative to the country at the 10
th percentile of 23 
 
banking development.
15  This higher labor growth rate amounts to 16% of the standard deviation 
of labor growth for the poor country sample.  
Perhaps surprisingly, we find a negative relationship between labor growth and 
interactions between industry-level dependence on external finance and indicators of financial 
development within the sample of high-income countries (Table 7, models 7 and 8). This could 
indicate that firms in externally financially dependent industries in countries with well-developed 
financial sectors were more likely to be down-sizing at the time of our surveys than firms in 
other industries. However, our sample is weighted heavily towards manufacturing firms and 
away from services. This result could also therefore reflect the shift of employment from 
manufacturing to services in many industrialized countries during this period.    
V.  Interactions between Firm Characteristics and Financial Structure 
In the previous section, we presented evidence consistent with a positive causal link between 
private credit/GDP and firm growth in poorer countries. To get a better idea of what types of 
firms are benefiting from bank finance in these poorer countries,
16 we interact the financial 
structure variables with firm characteristics using the following equation: 
                                                  (3) 
Notation is the same as in equation (1).  We focus first on the relationship between firm size, 
financial structure and firm growth. Small firms are defined as those with ten or fewer workers; 
medium-sized firms have from eleven to fifty workers; and large firms have more than fifty 
workers.  Note that our definitions of size cutoffs are somewhat smaller than many studies of 
mature economies, reflecting the fact that our sample has many more developing countries, 
which feature smaller firms in general than mature economies.   
In models where private credit/GDP is the financial structure variable, the coefficients for 
medium- and large-size are negative, and the one for large-size is significant indicating that the 
growth rates of small firms are higher than for others.
17 The negative coefficients for medium- 
and large-size are offset, however, by positive coefficients on the interactions between firm size 
                                                           
15 That is, 1.108 * 0.24 * (0.378 – 0.060). 
16 We do not find strong and consistent patterns for the rich subsample.  
17 Those coefficients are not shown in Table 8, but are discussed in the table notes. 24 
 
and private credit/GDP. The one for large firms is significant in the OLS regression and the ones 
for both medium and large-sized firms are significant in the GMM regressions (Table 8).
18 Those 
coefficients imply that labor growth rates for large firms in the low-income sample begin to 
exceed those for small firms only when private credit reaches 30-35 percent of GDP. Within the 
low income sample, only about a fifth of the countries meets or exceeds that standard.  
This suggests that the positive relationships between private credit/GDP and labor growth 
for the poorer countries in the previous section were driven by large firms in a small set of 
countries with well-developed credit markets. This would seem to be at odds with predictions 
from new structural economics in which banks are hypothesized to be well-positioned to help 
small-scale entrepreneurs in the earliest stages of development.
19 
We next divide firms by age, with old, mid-age, and young corresponding to the top, 
middle, and bottom thirds of the age distribution in our sample (Table 8). In the low-income 
sample, labor growth is declining in firm age, indicating that better established firms are less 
likely to be in an expansionary phase requiring the hiring of new workers.
20 Also, because we 
compute labor growth on a percentage basis as (L(t) – L(t-2))/L(t-2), incremental gains in 
employment affect small firms much more than they do large ones. Within the low-income 
sample, the beneficial effects of private credit development on the labor growth of firms appear 
to be largely independent of firm age. The coefficients on all of the interactions between firm age 
and private credit in the OLS regressions are positive, significant, and of almost identical 
magnitude. In the GMM regressions, coefficients on the interactions are also positive and of 
similar size across age categories, though they are only significant for middle-age and old firms.  
While firm age does not appear to have strong effects on the relationship between 
financial structure and firm labor growth, those relationships are sensitive to firms‘ capital 
intensity (Table 8).  We divide firms into high, mid, and low capital intensity, corresponding to 
the top, middle, and bottom thirds of the sample as measured by the ratio of capital to labor at the 
                                                           
18 In GMM estimation, the interaction terms of financial structure variables with firm characteristics are considered 
endogenous.  Instruments consist of the interaction of our old instrumental variables with firm characteristics. 
19 Of course, well-developed banks might have enabled these firms to grow from small to large over time. 
20 This is also true for the high-income sample, though results for that sample are not shown in Table 8.  25 
 
industry level. Within the sample of poorer countries, the positive effects of private credit/GDP 
on labor growth rates are higher among more capital-intensive firms. Similar to the results for 
firm size, this casts doubt on whether relatively well-developed credit markets in low income 
countries improve labor growth rates for less capital-intensive firms.  This, too, would seem to be 
at odds with predictions from new structural economics.
21   
To summarize, contrary to predictions from new structural economics that banks should 
disproportionately benefit small-scale entrepreneurs and manufacturers in the early stages of 
economic development, our results indicate that the labor growth rates of larger, capital-intensive 
firms are increasing in the level of private credit to GDP. While banks appear to be more 
important than stock markets for generating firm growth in low income economies, they do not 
seem to target the clients that new structural economics predicts would be most natural.  We 
cannot, however, rule out the possibility that banks enabled a subset of small firms to grow and 
become more capital-intensive over time. Of course, why only a subset of firms would have 
benefited from bank finance remains an open question. 
VI.  Mechanisms through Which Bank Finance Spurs Firm Development 
As a final empirical exercise and to further assess the plausibility of our main finding, we 
examine the relationships between our indicators of financial development and other firm-level 
performance variables (Table 9). Within the sample of low-income countries, we find that 
private credit/GDP is positively and significantly associated with firms‘ investment rates, which 
indicates that the labor growth associated with banking sector development is accompanied by 
capital investment. Similarly, private credit/GDP is positively associated with a dummy variable 
indicating that the firm provides training to its employees. This suggests that bank finance is 
associated not only with increasing the number of workers at firms in low-income countries, but 
also with developing their human capital, presumably to achieve productivity gains. Finally, in 
low-income countries private credit is also positively associated with firm size measured by 
number of employees. One concern was that our measure of labor growth focused on a short 
time horizon (2 years). The positive significant link between private credit and firm size is 
                                                           
21  Again, a relatively well developed banking sector might have might have enabled a subset of firms to become 
more capital-intensive over time. 26 
 
consistent with the idea that bank finance sustains firms over longer periods enabling them to 
expand over time. 
In contrast, neither private credit nor stock market capitalization is significantly 
associated with investment rates, firm size, or employee training within the sample of high-
income countries. Further, there is no strong relationship between stock market capitalization and 
the other firm outcome variables within the sample of low-income countries. These patterns 
mimic the ones that we found for labor growth and thus support our interpretation of our main 
finding regarding the beneficial effects of banking sector development in lower-income 
countries. 
VII.  Conclusions 
We have combined data from detailed firm surveys with indicators of financial development and 
structure that cover a broader set of countries than in earlier studies in order to study the 
relationships between firm growth, financial structure, and stage of economic development. In 
low-income countries, we find evidence that labor growth is swifter in countries with a higher 
level of private credit/GDP, consistent with predictions from new structural economics. This 
conclusion holds using two well-established estimation approaches for identifying the causal 
impact of financial development on growth: instrumental variables regressions and the Rajan-
Zingales methodology. The plausibility of the finding of the beneficial role of banks in poor 
countries is further boosted by our finding that a more developed banking system is associated 
with higher investment rates, more employee training, and larger firm sizes only in poor 
countries, which suggests that banks spur both physical and human capital investments besides 
boosting job growth in such countries. In high-income countries, we find that labor growth rates 
are increasing in the level of stock market capitalization, which could also be viewed as being 
consistent with predictions from new structural economics, though we are unable to provide 
evidence that the association is causal. 
At the same time, when we examine the types of firms that appear to benefit from well-
developed private credit markets in low-income countries, we find no evidence that it is the 
small-scale firms that benefit most. Rather, labor growth rates are increasing in the level of 
private credit market development for larger, capital-intensive firms. This pattern is more 27 
 
consistent with political economy explanations of how banking systems in low-income countries 
serve the interests of the elite, rather than providing broad-based access to financial services. 
We acknowledge that our approach comes with caveats and highlights gaps in our 
knowledge about the effects of financial structure. For example, our inability to find a suitable 
instrument for stock market development makes it difficult to study whether market 
capitalization enables firms to grow more quickly in high-income countries. Though again, our 
results using the RZ methodology also show no evidence of a positive link between stock market 
development and labor growth of firms in industries that depend heavily on external finance. 
Perhaps more importantly, though the enterprise surveys that we use offer rich 
information across a wide range of countries, our labor growth rates can only be computed over a 
two-year window. We are therefore relying on a snapshot of firm growth to draw inferences. 
Case studies of firm financing patterns and financial development in low income countries over 
longer periods are likely to offer a more complete picture of how firms grow. To the extent that 
some low-income countries have been better able to achieve financial inclusion, those case 
studies could shed light on how banks can foster growth across a broader spectrum of firms 
during the early stages of development. However, to the extent that the political economic 
incentives that limit the inclusiveness of financial systems in low-income countries cannot be 
overcome, it would be wise to explore how alternative policies and intermediaries could better 
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Table 1. Variable definitions and sources 
Variable name  Definitions 
Lgrow (labor growth)  Firm-level employment growth rate, from ICA data (i.e., the investment climate data). 
Private credit/GDP  Private Credit/GDP, from World Bank Financial Development and Structure Database. (Also available from WDI). 
Stock market/GDP  Stock Market Capitalization/GDP, World Bank Financial Development and Structure Database. 
Share of state banks  Share of banking sector assets held by government-owned banks, from Micco, Panizza, and Yanez (2007).  
Share of foreign banks  Share of banking sector assets held by foreign-owned banks, from Claessens and Van Horen (2009). 
Ln(L)  Log(firm size in terms of the number of employees), from ICA. 
Ln(firm age)  Log(firm age), from ICA. 
Ln(GDP per capita)  Log(GDP per capita), country level, WDI data. 
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                                                                                         Table 2. Variations in poor and rich countries 
For the poor region 
  N  mean  sd  p10  p25  p50  p75  p90  CV  p75/p25  p90/p10 
Labor growth  46.000  0.588  0.495  0.126  0.233  0.378  0.826  1.179  0.842  3.538  9.366 
Private credit/GDP  46.000  0.203  0.196  0.060  0.076  0.153  0.234  0.378  0.965  3.064  6.342 
Stock market cap./GDP  21.000  0.145  0.127  0.011  0.037  0.101  0.226  0.342  0.874  6.117  31.290 
Share of state banks  22.000  0.204  0.252  0.000  0.000  0.083  0.315  0.688  1.238  n.a.  n.a. 
Share of foreign banks  22.000  0.363  0.275  0.057  0.134  0.330  0.487  0.757  0.758  3.634  13.279 
Investment Rate  41.000  0.045  0.031  0.015  0.024  0.043  0.059  0.072  0.699  2.430  4.723 
Training dummy  46.000  0.333  0.169  0.126  0.204  0.318  0.438  0.512  0.509  2.144  4.063 
Ln(workers)  46.000  3.296  0.769  2.213  2.887  3.240  3.662  4.311  0.233  1.268  1.948 
                        For the rich region 
  N  mean  sd  p10  p25  p50  p75  p90  CV  p75/p25  p90/p10 
Labor growth  45.000  0.308  0.237  0.120  0.171  0.239  0.327  0.743  0.770  1.914  6.191 
Private credit/GDP  45.000  0.567  0.432  0.185  0.284  0.379  0.767  1.458  0.762  2.698  7.878 
Stock market cap./GDP  40.000  0.440  0.473  0.078  0.169  0.318  0.476  0.961  1.075  2.810  12.267 
Share of state banks  37.000  0.162  0.199  0.000  0.010  0.096  0.203  0.452  1.230  20.300  n.a. 
Share of foreign banks  37.000  0.460  0.326  0.065  0.181  0.435  0.730  0.917  0.708  4.033  14.043 
Investment Rate  24.000  0.038  0.026  0.012  0.018  0.035  0.048  0.077  0.688  2.621  6.363 
Training dummy  45.000  0.507  0.182  0.297  0.398  0.466  0.660  0.745  0.358  1.660  2.508 
Ln(workers)  45.000  3.282  0.530  2.680  2.929  3.226  3.504  4.030  0.161  1.196  1.504 
Note.  The poor and the rich samples each account for 50 percent of the (collapsed) country sample that deletes firms that have missing 
observations for labor growth and our base control variables. “N” is the number of countries. “sd” is standard deviation. “CV” is coefficient of 
variation. “p10, p25, p50, p75, p90” represent the 10th,25th, 50th, 75th, and 90th percentile, respectively. 
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Private Credit/  -0.2053 
                GDP  0.0536 
               
 
89 
                Stock Market  0.049  0.6625 
              Capitalization/GDP  0.7102  0 
             
 
60  64 
              Ln(workers)  -0.1868  0.0824  0.0941 
           
 
0.0779  0.4222  0.4596 
           
 
90  97  64 
            Ln(firm age)  -0.4425  0.3731  0.1781  0.4932 
         
 
0  0.0002  0.1591  0 
         
 
90  97  64  98 
          % foreign  0.1682  -0.1197  -0.018  0.0742  -0.2563 
        Ownership  0.1129  0.2429  0.8878  0.4675  0.0109 
       
 
90  97  64  98  98 
        Trust  0.0835  0.3569  0.2564  0.3525  0.2382  -0.2288 
     
 
0.5564  0.0069  0.0891  0.0077  0.077  0.0899 
     
 
52  56  45  56  56  56 
      Net Petroleum   -0.0421  -0.084  0.1981  0.1167  0.0443  -0.0975  0.2875 
    Exports per worker  0.6935  0.4136  0.1167  0.2525  0.6651  0.3398  0.0317 
   
 
90  97  64  98  98  98  56 
    British Legal  0.1538  0.1228  -0.0147  0.1748  -0.2012  0.3061  0.1101  -0.0222 
  Origin  0.249  0.3376  0.9271  0.1672  0.1109  0.0139  0.5419  0.8618 
 
 
58  63  41  64  64  64  33  64 
  Settler Mortality  0.3123  -0.5626  -0.5048  -0.305  -0.4241  0.4961  -0.1148  0.132  -0.0893 
Rate  0.044  0  0.0072  0.0371  0.003  0.0004  0.5846  0.3764  0.5508 
 
42  46  27  47  47  47  25  47  47 
Note.  The three numbers for each variable pair are the correlation coefficient, the p-value of statistical significance, and the number of observations. 35 
 
 



















intercept  1.315***  1.882**  0.258***  0.262***  -0.044  0.121  0.219***  0.227*** 
  (3.486)  (2.159)  (4.718)  (2.860)  (-0.400)  (0.950)  (3.381)  (4.275) 
ln(firm age)  0.024  0.014  0.040**  0.026*  0.046***  0.028**  0.045**  0.029*** 
  (1.203)  (0.891)  (1.999)  (1.782)  (2.998)  (2.066)  (2.161)  (2.678) 
foreign ownership  0.002  0.031  -0.044  0.009  0.009  0.026  -0.045  -0.006 
  (0.033)  (0.761)  (-0.720)  (0.226)  (0.236)  (0.683)  (-0.758)  (-0.153) 
ln(L)  0.015  0.014  0.025  0.010  0.005  0.004  0.023  0.013 
  (0.658)  (1.087)  (1.182)  (0.862)  (0.363)  (0.310)  (1.052)  (1.024) 
Settler Mortality  -0.221***  -0.367**             
  (-2.929)  (-1.991)             
Net Petroleum       -0.055  0.093         
Exports per Worker      (-1.162)  (1.276)         
Trust          0.015***  0.007     
          (2.928)  (1.442)     
British Legal Origin              0.094  0.059 
              (0.697)  (0.344) 
Number of observations  62,485  50,648  62,532  50,648  62,303  50,466  62,485  50,648 
Adjusted R2  0.161  0.232  0.034  0.042  0.171  0.038  0.032  0.010 
Note.  The table reports OLS regressions of indicators of financial development on potential instrumental variables and a set of controls. *, ** and 
*** represent statistical significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels; t-statistics are in parentheses. 
We have also tried dummies for commodity production as explanatory variables.  They tend to have insignificant coefficients for private 
credit/GDP and stock market capitalization/GDP; when they are significant, they are often of different sign than in Easterly and Levine (2003). 
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Table 5. OLS Regressions of labor growth on financial structure: 
Pooled, poor and rich samples 
    Pooled       Poor    Rich 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8)  (9) 
ln(workers)  0.035*  0.043  0.026  -0.000  0.043  0.011  0.029***  0.022  0.013 
  (1.684)  (1.611)  (1.462)  (0.011)  (1.225)  (0.547)  (2.664)  (1.591)  (1.012) 
ln(firm age)  -0.197***  -0.199***  -0.173***  -0.188***  -0.220***  -0.161***  -0.168***  -0.170***  -0.158*** 
  (7.786)  (7.535)  (-9.657)  (9.461)  (7.698)  (-9.481)  (9.111)  (8.421)  (-9.365) 
foreign ownership  0.006  -0.000  0.014  0.079  0.009  0.140*  0.022  0.026  0.047 
  (0.100)  (0.002)  (0.218)  (1.436)  (0.068)  (1.689)  (0.431)  (0.446)  (0.919) 
private credit  -0.040   
0.075  0.345*   
0.746***  -0.028   
-0.258* 
  (0.253)   
(0.352)  (1.937)   
(2.673)  (0.178)   
(-1.722) 
Stock mkt cap/GDP    0.045  0.134    0.205  -0.604    0.178  0.339** 
    (0.252)  (0.761)    (0.249)  (-0.548)    (1.199)  (2.096) 
ln(GDP per capita)     
-0.156***     
-0.271**     
-0.029 
     
(-2.872)     
(-2.070)     
(-0.462) 
Intercept  0.835***  0.766***  1.904***  0.963***  1.012***  2.582***  0.665***  0.597***  0.911* 
  (10.799)  (8.513)  (4.763)  (8.585)  (5.534)  (3.101)  (8.404)  (8.156)  (1.853) 
Number of observations  49,366  40,522  40,522  19,736  12,573  12,573  29,630  27,949  27,949 
Adjusted R2  0.040  0.041  0.087  0.055  0.048  0.114  0.033  0.046  0.066 
 
Standard errors clustered at the country level.  
*, **, and ***: significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels; t-statistics are in parentheses.   
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                            Table 6.  GMM estimates of determinants of labor growth:  the pooled, poor, and rich samples  
  Pooled sample  Poor sub-sample  Rich sub-sample 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (6)  (8)  (9)  (10)  (11)  (12) 
ln(GDP per capita)      -0.117***  -0.122***      -0.169**  -0.184      -0.024  -0.064 
      (2.749)  (2.711)      (2.304)  (1.210)      (0.361)  (1.391) 
ln(workers)  0.030**  0.039***  0.024**  0.021  -0.006  0.006  0.010  0.018  0.027***  0.036**  0.026**  0.028* 
  (2.129)  (2.859)  (2.153)  (1.478)  (0.237)  (0.137)  (0.474)  (0.469)  (3.119)  (2.462)  (2.522)  (1.929) 
ln(firm age)  -0.204***  -0.188***  -0.169***  -0.164***  -0.188***  -0.211***  -0.178***  -0.194***  -0.160***  -0.157***  -0.161***  -0.153*** 
  (8.342)  (8.348)  (11.627)  (11.513)  (9.403)  (10.388)  (8.795)  (9.765)  (9.044)  (8.252)  (10.466)  (8.480) 
foreign ownership  0.013  0.019  0.025  0.040  0.080*  0.115*  0.062  0.137**  0.043  0.030  0.043  0.033 
  (0.297)  (0.393)  (0.593)  (0.856)  (1.772)  (1.824)  (1.167)  (1.964)  (1.066)  (0.653)  (1.000)  (0.709) 
private credit  0.147    0.079    0.404*    0.494**    -0.191    -0.111   
  (0.452)    (0.387)    (1.690)    (2.166)    (0.927)    (0.508)   
Stock mkt cap/GDP    -0.095    0.053    1.228    1.486    -0.262    -0.140 
    (0.379)    (0.304)    (1.002)    (1.253)    (0.844)    (0.507) 
Intercept  0.780***  0.797***  1.625***  1.685***  0.954***  0.948***  1.922***  2.015**  0.731***  0.739***  0.899*  1.235*** 
  (6.940)  (7.915)  (5.706)  (4.817)  (8.536)  (4.246)  (4.211)  (1.988)  (6.908)  (6.058)  (1.826)  (3.236) 
Number of observations  49,162  40,364  49,162  40,364  19,690  12,573  19,690  12,573  29,472  27,791  29,472  27,791 
Adjusted R2  0.028  0.034  0.077  0.080  0.055  0.017  0.076  0.029  0.022  .  0.031  0.002 
First-stage F for excluded IVs  8.33  1.69  8.80  1.38  14.24  11.22  17.00  12.07  3.32  2.24  8.57  1.91 
p-value, Hansen‘s J  0.227  0.053  0.227  0.035  0.671  0.281  0.666  0.205  0.119  0.062  0.081  0.053 
Shea‘s adj. partial R-sq  0.861  0.702  0.531  0.521  0.550  0.704  0.793  0.472  0.390  0.484  0.426  0.568 
 standard errors clustered at the country level.   *, **, and ***: significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels; t-statistics are in parentheses. 
The two financial variables (private credit/GDP and stock market capitalization/GDP) are considered endogenous.  Instruments are: petroleum net exports per 
capita (lagged), average trust 1981-2006.   
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Table 7. Rajan-Zingales Approach: The Effect of Financial Development on Labor Growth by Dependence on External Finance 
  Poor    Rich 
                   
    (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)    (5)  (6)  (7)  (8) 
ln(L)    0.044**  0.078**  0.065***  0.079***    0.018*  0.012  0.031***  0.031*** 
    (2.378)  (2.508)  (8.593)  (6.634)    (1.888)  (1.050)  (6.718)  (6.337) 
ln(firm age)    -0.180***  -0.207***  -0.187***  -0.204***    -0.161***  -0.154***  -0.191***  -0.188*** 
    (8.978)  (7.831)  (17.349)  (13.996)    (10.131)  (8.385)  (20.216)  (19.113) 
foreign ownership    -0.017  -0.090  -0.039  -0.083    0.005  -0.002  -0.013  -0.017 
    (0.219)  (0.618)  (1.145)  (1.187)    (0.140)  (0.037)  (0.671)  (0.829) 
ln(GDPpc)    -0.118  -0.116  -0.166  0.122    -0.014  -0.035  0.003  -0.007 
    (1.463)  (0.809)  (1.439)  (0.818)    (0.286)  (0.718)  (0.149)  (0.273) 
external dependence     -0.305***  -0.085        0.051  -0.127     
    (2.789)  (0.352)        (0.421)  (0.748)     
Private credit*Ext. Dep.    0.890***    1.108***      -0.123    -0.149***   
    (6.754)    (5.116)      (0.703)    (3.439)   
Stock market cap*Ext.       0.786    -0.791      0.138    -0.130*** 
Dep.      (0.649)    (1.155)      (0.529)    (3.073) 
Country Dummies    NO  NO  YES  YES    NO  NO  YES  YES 
Industry Dummies    NO  NO  YES  YES    NO  NO  YES  YES 
Number of observations    14,132  9,384  14,132  9,384    19,660  18,547  19,660  18,547 
Adjusted R2    0.080  0.063  0.244  0.232    0.034  0.034  0.155  0.158 
Notes. The Table shows OLS regressions; standard errors clustered at the country-industry level. *,**, and *** represent significance at the 10, 
5, and 1 per cent levels; t-statistics are in parentheses. External dependence is the industry-level dependence on external finance based on U.S. 
data, which is equal to external finance (capital expenditures minus cash flow from operations) divided by capital expenditures, as defined in 
Rajan and Zingales (1998).  The correspondence between the industry classifications in the Rajan and Zingales paper and in our dataset is as 
follows: 
1 "Textiles":  same 
2 "Leather":   same 
3 "Garments":   same 
4 "Agroindustry":  average of “beverage” and “food products” from RZ. 
5 "Food":  same. 39 
 
6 "Beverages": same 
7 "Metals and machinery": metal products. 
8 "Electronics":  electric machinery (which contains electronic components) 
9 "Chemicals and pharmaceutics":  average of “drugs” and “other chemicals” from RZ. 
10 "Construction":  “transportation equipment” 
23 "Transport": “transportation equipment” 
11 "Wood and furniture":  same. 
12 "Nonmetallic and plastic materials": plastic products. 
13 "Paper":  average of “pulp, paper” and “paper and paper products” from RZ. 
14 "Sport goods":  “other industries”. 
15 "IT services":  missing. 
16 "Other manufacturing": “other industries”. 
26 "Auto and auto components":  “motor vehicles”. 
27 "Other transport equipment":  “ships”. 
The following industries (mostly services) in our data are coded as missing, because external financial dependence measures are not available for 
them from RZ:   Other unclassified, Telecommunications, Accounting and finance, Advertising and marketing, Other services, Retail and 











Table 8. Private Credit and Labor Growth by Firm Characteristics, Poor Sub-sample 
  OLS  GMM 
Private Credit by Firm Size     
Priv*Small (<= 10 workers)  -0.529  -0.202 
  (-0.989)  (-0.246) 
Priv*Medium (11-50 workers)  0.348  0.747** 
  (1.531)  (2.451) 
Priv*Large (>50 workers)  0.669***  0.791*** 
  (7.293)  (9.038) 
Private Credit by Firm Age     
Priv*Young   0.498***  0.388 
  (3.205)  (1.591) 
Priv*Middle-aged  0.497***  0.484** 
  (2.838)  (2.142) 
Priv*Old  0.497***  0.508** 
  (3.102)  (2.565) 
Private credit by Firm Capital 
Intensity 
   
Priv*Low  0.381  0.284 
  (1.571)  (0.876) 
Priv*Medium  0.615***  0.524*** 
  (4.787)  (3.008) 
Priv*High  0.472***  0.302 
  (3.740)  (1.116) 
Notes. This table shows regression coefficients for the interaction between private credit/GDP and 
various firm characteristics (size, age, and capital intensity). The interaction terms for each characteristic 
were included in separate regressions. In addition to the firm characteristics, the regressions also 
control for the share of foreign ownership in the firm and the logarithm of GDP per capita in each 
country. Standard errors are clustered at the country level. *,**, and *** represent significance at the 
10, 5, and 1 per cent levels. Firm characteristics enter the regressions not only as part of an interaction 
with private credit, but also on their own. For reference, the coefficients for the medium and large firm 
dummies for the OLS regression described in the top third of the table are -.097 and -.221**, 
respectively. The coefficients for the middle-aged and old dummies for the OLS regression described in 
the middle third of the table are -.126*** and -.311***, respectively. The coefficients for the medium 
and high capital intensity dummies for the OLS regression described in the bottom third of the table are 

















  Investment Rate  Training  Firm Size 
Private Credit       
       
Poor Sub-sample  0.032***  0.441***  1.588*** 
  (5.026)  (3.670)  (7.582) 
Rich Sub-sample  -0.001  -0.063  0.190 
  (-0.093)  (-1.139)  (0.816) 
       
Stock Market 
Capitalization 
     
       
Poor Sub-sample  -0.005  -0.127  2.198* 
  (-0.135)  (-0.286)  (1.733) 
Rich Sub-sample  -0.010  -0.063  0.364 
  (-1.551)  (-1.455)  (1.296) 
This table shows coefficients for indicators of financial development from OLS regressions of firm 
outcomes (Investment rate, training, and firm size) on financial indicators and other controls. Each 
coefficient in the table comes from a separate regression. Those regressions also control for firm 
characteristics (number of workers, age, and share of foreign ownership in the firm) and per capita 
income in each country. Standard errors are clustered at the country level. *,**, and *** represent 
significance at the 10, 5, and 1 per cent levels. Training is a dummy variable indicting whether the firm 












     
ln(firm age)  4.546***  0.029** 
  (3.144)  (2.075) 
foreign ownership  0.363  0.029 
  (0.098)  (0.809) 
ln(workers)  0.620  0.003 
  (0.483)  (0.213) 
Trust  1.559***  0.005 
  (3.206)  (1.443) 
Petroleum net export 
per worker  -9.032**  0.080 
  (-2.410)  (1.220) 
Intercept  -6.773  0.146 
  (-0.624)  (1.277) 
Number of 
observations  62,303  50,466 
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Appendix B.  Sensitivity Checks, Industry Controls, Rule of Law, Political stability 
  Poor  Rich 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8) 
ln(L)  -0.002  0.022  0.015  0.050**  0.035***  0.028***  0.020*  0.011 
  (0.101)  (1.018)  (1.282)  (2.305)  (3.735)  (2.869)  (1.931)  (0.969) 
ln(firm age)  -0.187***  -0.176***  -0.172***  -0.215***  -0.176***  -0.179***  -0.161***  -0.153*** 
  (9.640)  (8.113)  (7.741)  (6.209)  (6.804)  (7.332)  (8.136)  (8.024) 
foreign ownership  0.103*  0.053  0.064  -0.026  0.015  0.029  0.038  0.040 
  (1.707)  (0.567)  (1.302)  (0.274)  (0.334)  (0.631)  (0.773)  (0.798) 
private credit  0.611**    0.498***    0.145    0.113   
  (2.476)    (3.419)    (0.684)    (0.536)   
stock/GDP    -0.077    0.448    0.299***    0.256* 
    (0.079)    (0.603)    (2.826)    (1.933) 
Agri./GDP  0.872  1.591*      -0.059  1.820     
  (1.622)  (1.789)      (0.057)  (1.638)     
Maufacture/GDP  -0.738  2.584*      -1.746**  -2.344***     
  (0.638)  (1.925)      (2.535)  (4.039)     
rule of law      -0.520***  -0.630***      -0.150  -0.236*** 
      (3.643)  (3.421)      (1.336)  (2.653) 
political stability      0.105  0.253      0.004  0.083 
      (0.727)  (1.229)      (0.050)  (0.906) 
intercept  0.790***  0.229  0.565***  0.778***  0.952***  0.910***  0.610***  0.585*** 
  (2.790)  (0.538)  (3.656)  (3.865)  (6.716)  (6.750)  (5.638)  (7.381) 
Number of observations  18,868  12,573  19,736  12,573  24,062  22,580  29,630  27,949 
Adjusted R2  0.077  0.090  0.105  0.114  0.052  0.088  0.048  0.075 
The table reports OLS regressions of labor growth on indicators of financial development, firm characteristics, and country-level controls. 
Standard errors clustered at the country level.  
*, **, and ***: significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels; t-statistics are in parentheses. 
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                             Appendix C.  LIML estimates of determinants of labor growth:  the pooled, poor, and rich samples  
  Pooled sample  Poor sub-sample  Rich sub-sample 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8)  (9)  (10)  (11)  (12) 
ln(GDP per capita)      -0.148**  -0.179      -0.164**  -0.320      0.007  -0.053 
      (2.273)  (1.522)      (2.154)  (1.349)      (0.084)  (1.046) 
ln(workers)  0.029**  0.042**  0.024**  0.019  -0.003  -0.000  0.011  0.005  0.028***  0.039**  0.029***  0.031* 
  (2.041)  (2.513)  (2.040)  (0.924)  (0.137)  (0.007)  (0.502)  (0.104)  (3.227)  (2.477)  (2.623)  (1.896) 
ln(firm age)  -0.201***  -0.200***  -0.173***  -0.176***  -0.187***  -0.212***  -0.178***  -0.193***  -0.156***  -0.157***  -0.158***  -0.152*** 
  (7.074)  (4.724)  (10.664)  (6.743)  (9.232)  (10.257)  (8.718)  (8.597)  (8.778)  (8.176)  (10.722)  (8.339) 
foreign ownership  0.016  0.002  0.014  0.017  0.086*  0.099  0.067  0.097  0.036  0.018  0.035  0.023 
  (0.342)  (0.023)  (0.301)  (0.271)  (1.869)  (1.240)  (1.197)  (0.905)  (0.936)  (0.373)  (0.869)  (0.467) 
private credit  0.113    0.235    0.374    0.475*    -0.254    -0.235   
  (0.298)    (0.736)    (1.496)    (1.944)    (1.114)    (0.807)   
Stock mkt cap/GDP    0.112    0.412    1.461    2.354    -0.306    -0.211 
    (0.168)    (0.542)    (1.083)    (1.440)    (0.879)    (0.612) 
Intercept  0.791***  0.750***  1.794***  2.042***  0.962***  0.912***  1.898***  2.766*  0.768***  0.747***  0.702  1.161*** 
  (6.067)  (4.271)  (4.525)  (2.701)  (8.620)  (3.641)  (4.059)  (1.902)  (6.468)  (5.688)  (1.216)  (2.828) 
Observations  49,162  40,364  49,162  40,364  19,690  12,573  19,690  12,573  29,472  27,791  29,472  27,791 
Adjusted R2  0.032  0.039  0.077  0.069  0.055  0.002  0.076  .  0.012  .  0.015  . 
standard errors clustered at the country level.   *, **, and ***: significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels; t-statistics are in parentheses. 
The two financial variables are considered endogenous.  Instruments are: net  petroleum export per worker (2000-2005 average), average trust 1981-2006.   
 